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In this article we endeavour to explain events leading up to and the outcome 
of the battle of Monchín in Medina de Rioseco (in Valladolid) during the 
Peninsular war (1808 – 1814). We examine the different points of view of 
English historians such as Robert Southey, William Napier, Charles Stuart 
and Charles Esdaile, whose opinions don’t differ greatly concerning the 




The Peninsular War (1808-1814), which decided the fate of Spain and in 
large part that of Europe, was brought about through the presence of a foreign 
king imposed by force of arms and that of a French army which remained in the 
country in order to uphold the foreign monarch, thus seriously imperilling the 
national unity. This, in itself, brought about a national uprising supported and 
seconded by people from all social classes and spectrums. 
The month of May, 1808, is the date given by historians as the beginning 
of the uprising by the Spaniards against the Napoleonic invasion. This invasion 
really commenced in 1806 when Napoleon Bonaparte decided to fight Britain 
by attacking its economy and tried to force the nations of continental Europe to 
close their ports to British goods. The conflict was precipitated when Portugal 
refused to comply with Napoleon's Continental System. By a secret convention 
reached at Fontainebleau in October 1807, Spain agreed to support France 
against Portugal. A French army under Marshal Junot occupied in November of 
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that same year Portugal, and King John VI and his family fled to Brazil without 
resisting. Napoleon then began a series of manoeuvres to secure Spain for 
France. On the pretext that they were reinforcements for Junot, large numbers 
of French troops entered Spain and seized Pamplona and Barcelona. On March 
23 the French marshal Murat entered Madrid. Portugal would not agree to join 
the pact, and Napoleon proposed and pushed through a joint Spanish-French 
invasion of Portugal. After some political wrangling Napoleon's next decision 
was to add Spain and Portugal to the French Empire. He occupied Spain and 
attempted to occupy Portugal. 
The first uprising, that of the 2nd May 1808 in Madrid, was rapidly 
followed by others in Corunna, Valladolid and Santander, among other places, 
which rapidly spread to encompass the whole Peninsula and bring about a 
conventional war which, despite resistance of all kinds, permitted the triumph of 
the French forces and the occupation of Spain, especially of the main towns and 
cities. It was in Valladolid, the second focus of the insurrection, that general 
Cuesta, giving heed to the clamour of the masses, authorized two “Juntas”, of 
“Armamento” and “Defensa” for the whole of Old Castile. A popular uprising 
was not something Napoleon had bargained for and to combat it he launched 
punishing operations against the places where the rebels were entrenched, 
among these Old Castile. After Valladolid was taken by the Napoleonic army, 
despite the resistance of Cuesta, aided by general Blake with reinforcements 
from Galicia and Asturias, the Spanish forces were defeated in the decisive 
battle of Rioseco. 
This victory by the French permitted the march towards Madrid of the new 
king appointed by Napoleon, Joseph the First. 
It is in this context that the present article is situated, in which we 
endeavour to analyze the said battle through the perusal of historic documents, 
both contemporary to the events and of a later date, in order to see the authors’ 
opinion of the Battle of Rioseco, or as it is sometimes called locally, the battle 
of Monclin, since this is the place in which it was fought. This place was of 
strategic importance to both armies since it is located in the heart of Tierra de 
Campos, at a crossing of the ways close to the Torozos hills, which command 
the highest vantage point in the province of Valladolid. 
The fact that studies of the Peninsular War have up to now generally 
centred on the historiography of the contending powers- France and Spain 
without paying due attention, perhaps, to English sources has led us to direct 
our analysis to interpreting and comparing the different points of view about the 
events leading up to and involving the battle mentioned above. 
The Spanish historian, Albi de la Cuesta (2002) underlines the really 
staggering differences in the points of view of British and Spanish writers when 
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considering Napoleonic period in the Peninsula. This affirmation, however 
doesn’t hold good because neither do all British historians think alike when 
evaluating the events leading up to and taking place in the Peninsular war, nor 
do their opinions always differ from those of their Spanish counterparts. 
It is sufficient to mention two cases to show the differences that existed 
between the viewpoints of the different British historians: those of Robert 
Southey and those of William Napier. The former, a poet and a traveller as well 
as a historian, was very favourable to Spain, as is shown in his work The 
History of the peninsular War (1832), and was consequently cold-shouldered by 
Wellington who did not permit him access to any document dealing with 
military affairs or battles in which the English forces took part during the 
Peninsular War. These documents were, however, ceded to Napier, who, thanks 
to the wealth of detail contained therein, wrote his History of the War in the 
Peninsula (1840), much more to the liking of the British command, since in it 
the author continually extols the merits of the British army, to the point even of 
tendentiousness. 
Our study of the opinions of British and Spanish sources concerning the 
Battle of Rioseco, leads us to consider that they do not differ greatly the ones 
from the others. They coincide to a large extent with regards the antecedents, 
the development, the causes and the consequences of the Spanish defeat. Where 
there is almost exact coincidence is in the undoubted importance of this victory 
for Napoleon’s troops over the Spanish and English forces as well as in the 
description of the unlicensed sacking of the city, which was accompanied by all 
types of atrocities, as well as in the fact that it permitted and facilitated the 
French march on Madrid. There are a few differences of opinion regarding the 
exact reasons for such a calamitous defeat, but there is almost complete 
agreement in respect to the ability and ingenuity of the three principal generals 
in question: García de la Cuesta and Blake on the Spanish side and Bessières on 
that of the French.  
Gregorio Garcia de la Cuesta (1740 – 1812) who had been one of the most 
outstanding Spanish soldiers at the beginning of the war with France, was also 
the one who was less well considered by the British allies. His service record in 
Peru as well as in the Rousillon campaign had been brilliant but at 68 years old 
he was considered too old for the post of command. Besides, he was quite ill, 
(as Areilza (1985) points out; he walked with a limp, which meant that to 
traverse the line fire he had to be taken in cart drawn by six mules, and he had 
to be lifted on to his horse), but worst of all, he was self-willed and obstinate. 
Napier, who saw things from the point of view of the typical aristocratic 
conservative, doesn’t lose any opportunity to criticize and disparage the Spanish 
forces, and Cuesta in particular. He lays the whole blame on him for the defeat 
JOSÉ RAMÓN FERNÁNDEZ SUÁREZ ET ALII 
ES 28 (2007-8): 89-96 
92 
of Rioseco, accusing him of improvisation, “so typical of the Spaniards” and 
makes comments like the following: “…for the Spanish general with the usual 
improvidence of his nation, had established all his magazines in the open towns 
of the flat country.” (Napier 1840:69). In fact, by laying the whole blame on 
Cuesta, Napier exonerates Blake: “Cuesta, assuming the command, chose the 
last (attacking Bessières in open country) though he had few horsemen and 
Bessières had many. He left, against Blake’s wishes, a division to protect his 
stores…” (Napier 1840:69).  
Areilza, for his part, after analyzing the role of the ageing general in the 
Peninsular War, comes to the conclusion that he was more of a hindrance than a 
help to the English. He recognizes the general’s valour but affirms that he was 
old-fashioned. He also believes that he was violent-tempered and headstrong 
and that his efficiency on the battle field was low and that he apparently had no 
idea of military strategy or tactics. Arthur Wellesley, later Viscount of Talavera 
and Duke of Wellington, who was with Cuesta in the battle of Talavera, 
criticized him for not taking sufficiently into consideration the importance of 
the terrain on which the battle was waged and of giving too much importance to 
the possible manoeuvres and strategies which the enemy could mount. 
Another opinion, which endeavours to be more favourable to Cuesta, is 
that of the British author, Charles Stuart, 3rd Marquis of Londonderry. In his 
book, Narratives of the Peninsular War (1829), he defines him as lacking in 
talent, though he admits that he was brave and just and, above all a man of his 
word. 
Charles Esdaile, a contemporary writer, author of The Peninsular War 
(2003), and teacher at University of Liverpool, endeavours to exonerate Cuesta 
from some of the blame for the failures and inclines rather to cast doubts on the 
performance of Blake who, he says, was really too young and inexperienced, 
and who, besides, was dispirited and doubtful of the outcome. 
A cautious and relatively junior officer – at the time of the uprising he had 
been a mere brigadier – Blacke Would have much preferred not to risk his 
army in combat for some while yet and, having almost no cavalry, was all too 
well aware of the dangers of operating in the plains of Castile. (Esdaile 
2003:71). 
Esdaile is, however, in no doubt when he points out the tremendous 
strategic error which in his opinion cost the battle, due solely to precipitation 
and lack of information as to the enemy’s movements or lack of expertise in the 
final preparations, when he points out that defeat was due to the fact that the 
French were expected to attack from the direction of Valladolid, when they, in 
fact, attacked unexpectedly from the direction of Palencia, thus upsetting all the 
tactical plans of the defending army. 
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As for Spanish authors, they show themselves just as critical with Cuesta; 
Rojo Vega (2000) calls him “useless”; González de Sásamo (1850) is of the 
opinion that he showed a considerable lack of skill in the battle of Cabezón de 
Pisuerga, the 12th June 1808, and that, despite the enormous losses amongst the 
Spanish troops, he continued his retreat with absolute tranquillity and, without 
pausing, withdrew with his cavalry into Rioseco to present battle once more to 
the French, with the same result. Sancho (1989), in the book edited by Grupo 
Pinciano and titled Valladolid. Diarios Curiosos (1807-1841) coincides in this 
judgement and underlines the differences of opinion between Blake and Cuesta, 
when he says: 
… que habiendo ocurrido varias disputas entre el general Cuesta, y el de 
Galicia, llamado Blake, excusándose éste a continuar la acción por decir que 
sus tropas no debían venir en auxilio de Castilla y sí solo de sus provincias 
gallegas y puestos, se dispersó el ejército. (Sancho et al. 1989:135) 
Sancho and Esdaile also refer to the difficult relations between Blake and 
Cuesta: “De estas desavenencias causadas por el General Blake y otros de sus 
jefes, según se decía, resultó que los franceses tomaron fomento y se 
rehaciesen” (Sancho et al. 1989:136). Esdaile’s comments cast at least some of 
the blame for the defeat at Rioseco on Blake’s shoulders: “…but the unwilling 
Blake in fact moved very slowly” (Esdaile 2003:71) and “…for Blake had also 
insisted on keeping his army separate from that of Cuesta” (Esdaile 2003:71).  
Consequently, we can say that all the historians studied up to now have 
coincided in considering the differences of opinion between Blake and Cuesta 
to be important and an added factor in the ultimate defeat, though some of them 
endeavour to a certain extent to exonerate Blake: “Nuestro general Blake se 
portó perfectamente, y sentimos no poder decir lo mismo de Cuesta” (Sancho et 
al. 1989:136). 
General Joaquín Blake (1759-1827) of Irish ancestry but born in Málaga, 
began his military career at the age of fifteen years. The vicissitudes of his 
chosen career saw him present at the blockade of Gibraltar and later taking part 
in the siege of Mahón; he also took part in the battles of Zara and Urrunge, in 
the Western Pyrenees. A short time after the Peninsular War began, he was 
ascended to General, without having passed through the post of Field Marshall, 
by the Junta of Galicia so that he could lead their army, in substitution for 
General Filangieri, who had been murdered a short time previously. On being 
appointed to general he was expressly ordered to obey only the orders that came 
to him from the Galician Junta, and this was the initial cause of his frictions 
with Cuesta.  
According to Esdaile, after the defeat of Cabezón de Pisuerga the Spanish 
needed to attack the French rapidly with all their forces; Blake, however, 
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considered it dangerous to launch an attack in the plains of Castile and, a prey 
to despondency, he acted very slowly. Besides, he left two divisions of the four 
in his power behind to cover his retreat and to make sure that Galicia was 
suitably protected. In fact, Blake’s service record leaves no doubt about his 
merits and the main criticism of him in the various sources regarding his part in 
the battle at Rioseco is of his lack of experience as well as overriding loyalty to 
the Galician Junta. Blake died in Valladolid, the 27th April, 1827, in Calle 
López Gómez, where a plaque records his memory. 
As for the figure of Jean Pierre Bessières (1763-1813), most historians are 
in agreement that it was thanks to the circumstances of the battle rather than to 
any great skill on his part that left him the victor. He was one of the few 
marshalls who could consider himself a friend of Napoleon Bonaparte. In his 
distinguished military career, he took part in several actions, among those the 
fight with the Swiss Guard to save Louis XVI, the Napoleonic campaigns in 
Egypt and the battle of Austerlitz. In the Peninsular Campaign, apart from 
winning the battle of Medina de Rioseco, he fought at Somosierra and pursued 
the retreating army of Sir John Moore to Corunna. He was, in a word, a 
charismatic soldier much admired by his men, despite his reputation for being a 
strict disciplinarian. But, returning to the comments we made previously, the 
general opinion among the different authors with respect to the battle of 
Rioseco is that he was favoured with fortune and took advantage of the mistakes 
made by the Spanish army. 
Esdaile is the only one to point out that Bessières’ strategy was superior 
since he had infiltrated spies in the Spanish ranks so as to learn their plans 
beforehand. But, as well as praising these tactics, he underlines the importance 
of the tactical error of the Spanish forces in believing that the attacking French 
would come from the direction of Valladolid and not of Palencia. 
Napier, on his part, also shows great admiration for the French Marshall, 
although he also lays special critical emphasis on the Spanish forces, declaring 
scornfully that their “patriotism” needed to be fuelled by money: “Spanish 
patriotism always required large sums of money” (Napier 1840:64) or pointing 
out that the strategy of the Spanish consisted in increasing the number of 
fighting men without regard to their effectiveness: “The second line composed 
of the best troops, augmented, not strengthened, by some eighteen thousand 
armed peasants…” (Napier 1840:68). For his part, Sancho (1989) is also of the 
opinion that the French troops were encouraged (“tomaron fomento”) and their 
resolve strengthened by the divisions between the Spanish generals. 
With regard to the battle of Rioseco itself, it has to be pointed out that all 
the authors consulted are adamant in claiming that the Spanish generals’ tactical 
errors and their differences of opinion were the reason for the defeat. Some even 
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go further and allude to the “total incapacity” of the Spanish forces. Napier, for 
example, gives an ample account of the errors in deployment of the forces as 
well as of the advantages and disadvantages of many of the manoeuvres carried 
out. He says, for example, that Cuesta should have remained close to his base in 
Galicia, that he should not have left his stores of ammunition at Benavente and 
that he should have waited a few days more before confronting Bessières at 
Rioseco so as to give time for the British warships to bombard Santander, thus 
weakening Bessières’ reserves. Above all he criticizes Cuesta’s having taken on 
Bessières in open country. Esdaile agrees affirming that the defeat was due to 
an error of calculation on the part of the Spanish, particularly on that of Cuesta. 
Sancho believes that the defeat was due to a dispute between Cuesta and 
Blake, who was of the opinion that the first duty of his troops was to defend the 
Galician provinces and not to help out the Castilian army. For this reason he 
dispersed his army leaving Cuesta to fend for himself, being obliges to retreat 
towards Toro, Zamora and Salamanca. 
One last point many of the authors we have studied mention – very often in 
exaggerated terms – the contribution to the fray. Napier, whenever he can, 
emphasizes the “generous” English contribution towards the Spanish cause: “… 
the abundant supplies poured in from England were beginning to be felt” 
(Napier 1840:64); “They (The French) halted the 15th but the next day entered 
Benavente and captured many thousand English muskets and vast quantities of 
ammunition” (Napier 1840:68). Sancho, on his part, also underlines the fact that 
the English lent all the help they could to General Cuesta after the defeat at 
Cabezón so that he could take on the French at Rioseco. 
As can be seen, there is practically complete agreement among the 
different historians about the battle of Rioseco; some point out the good fortune 
that attended Bessières, while others the poor organization of the Spanish and 
the lack of coordination between Cuesta and Blake, taking on the French in 
open country without the necessary contingents of cavalry, leaving part of the 
army behind to protect Galicia, and not protecting the ammunition stores at 
Benavente. All of this explains how, following the defeat of the Spanish and 
before the famous victory at Bailén, Napoleon could exclaim: “Bessières has 
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